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b. This arrangement solved our immediate tactical problem. Now, however, the question arises whether the time has come to seek to eliminate the US surveillance flights which continue to exacerbate our relations with Fidel and which set a dangerous precedent by creating the impression before the world that capitalist nations have the right to protect themselves by conducting espionage operations through socialist skies.

3. Considerations.

a. Not only the problems cited above, but also the risk that the US may seek to use her U-2 flights to create an incident as an excuse for further action against Cuba, make it desirable to eliminate such flights or to take the initiative in creating an incident in order that we may structure it to suit ourselves.

b. The US domestic political situation and the USG's concern over our political flanking maneuvers in Latin America is such that the capitalist government may find itself increasingly motivated to take forceful action to overturn the revolution in Cuba. The October missile crisis taught us that, contrary to the advice of certain socialist circles, the US capitalist government can still find the courage to use force.

c. They are reinforced in their motivation to do so, and we in turn are restrained, by our mutual knowledge that the capitalist

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world at the present time has appreciably greater strategic power than does the socialist world.

d. Certain circles in our Government point to the need to take a hard line not only to support Fidel, but also to prove to the Chinese Communists and those who follow their lead that we Soviet Communists have not become soft. These circles, including certain deviationist leaders, even impugn the fitness of you, Comrade Nikita, to continue as our leader. Other circles clamor that the resource allocation problem is critical and that we must find a way to improve the yearning of our socialist citizens for an improved standard of living. And as you know, each time we heat up our relations with the decadent West, they tend to pull together, increase their defense expenditures, and force us to continue or increase our heavy defense burden.

#### 4. Conclusion.

a. Cessation of US reconnaissance flights over Cuba is highly desirable, but any scenario for accomplishing this would have disadvantages and risks.

b. The capitalist preponderance of power makes a major confrontation unwise; our internal problems make it undesirable.

c. Ideological considerations make it necessary that we demonstrate firmness of resolve and Communist offensive spirit in connection with working out any detente with the US on this matter;

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yet the orchestration of this offensive must minimize the opportunity for the US to capitalize on our moves to overturn or further to harass Castro.

5. Optimum Course of Action.

If the Presidium decides that the elimination of U-2 flights over Cuba is sufficiently important to hazard the risks and accept the disadvantages, the following scenario is recommended:

a. The Soft Beginning. The offensive would be initiated by Fidel (to maintain the David/Goliath image), who would go to the UN with a demand that US violation of Cuban sovereignty by aerial overflight be discontinued. We would come to his support, reiterating the great efforts we had made to save the peace of the world by removal of our missiles and aircraft which were there to protect him from US aggression. We would remind the world that our patience is not unlimited and of the action we were forced to take against US U-2s which operated over our Fatherland in an earlier era. Pressures would be brought to bear from all circles. We would let it be known privately that the sole reason for the retention of USSR troops in Cuba is to protect that beleaguered nation from the designs of the US and that a detente involving the removal of these troops, cessation of U-2 flights, and a UN guarantee of Fidel's status sans offensive armaments could be worked out. (In actual fact, we should try to get a situation in

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which the U-2 flights stopped immediately and troop removals commenced in phases thereafter. This would appear to be a socialist victory and might permit us to find some pretext later for retaining a lower level of troops in Cuba.) We might have to settle for some arrangement in which the frequency of U-2 flights was slowed down as troop removals took place and ended when the last of our troops were out. It might also be necessary to permit a UN observation group to enter Cuba. We could insist in this event that the same group have access to other Caribbean countries which have been a base of subversion against Castro. Or alternatively, we could achieve a victorious connotation by insisting that the UN presence in Cuba provide for the integrity of Fidel's regime and Cuba's sovereignty.

b. Phase Two--Increasing Pressures. Having stated a convincing case, in the UN and before the world, of the inadmissibility of continued US reconnaissance over a sovereign and independent state, and the reasonableness of our proposed solution, and in the absence of US movement toward our proposals, we should accentuate pressures. The reasoned nature of our package should minimize the risk of US escalation against Castro as our pressures increase.

Our primary purpose during this phase would be to sow disarray among the US and her allies. We should let the UK in particular know privately that we are reluctant to do so but that action against

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Berlin may be necessary to bring the US around. We should urge the reasonableness of our Cuban package upon them, pointing out that they are really captive to US interests there which are based on concerns contrary to UK interests and no longer justified. We should hint that progress on test ban and increased trade are possible if we can achieve the better climate that cessation of Cuban overflights would bring. We should let the French and Germans know that Berlin is in new jeopardy because the US has refused to accept a reasonable proposal for Cuba and that our patience is not unlimited.

After these pressures have been brought to bear both privately and through the full force of our apparatus, we should let it be known that we are about to turn over the SAM sites to the Cubans and can no longer be responsible for their restraint. The frequency of our aerial penetrations of Norway, Alaska, and other NATO areas should be increased. These actions should be accompanied by new private warnings to the allies that harassments at Berlin must soon be forthcoming.

c. Final Phase--Will the US Blink? Our measures to date will have consisted of the careful spelling out of a reasonable proposal despite US intransigence, and of verbal pressures. The prospect seems excellent that the US will have been brought to the conference table at this point. If she has not, we will face the painful choice of terminating our scenario unsuccessfully or of risking more drastic

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measures. Our final choice would have to depend on our over-all evaluation of the degree to which we had been able to splinter the Western alliance, and of the resolve of the US Government. One choice that would seem clearly ruled out is the shooting down of a U-2, since that could provide the US with the excuse she may have been looking for to eliminate Castro. (For that reason, despite our threats to do so, we should not turn over the SAMs to Fidel in this time-frame, unless you have already become committed to do so, during his recent visit.) On the other hand the peculiar legalistic/Christian mores of the West would make it difficult for the US to justify an attack on Cuba for action taken by us elsewhere. One such action which could serve to establish the bona fides of our intentions, with the US and her allies, would be the shooting down of a US ECM espionage aircraft with the claim that it had violated our territorial waters. But the initiation of harassments at Berlin, of measured and careful nature, and after adequate and subtle development, would be more likely to provide the variety of pressures on the US that we would need. These interferences should not be escalated to serious levels but rather should be conducted in such a way that if the US does not give in over Cuban overflights we can use that intransigence to win some small improvement re Berlin.

d. Minimum Settlement. Our orchestration should not be initiated unless the accomplishment of our objective for Cuba seems

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reasonably probable. On the other hand, recognizing the enigmatic quality of the political equation involved, we must consider the minimum settlement we can accept. This is judged to be one in which you, Comrade Khrushchev, would be able to show some improvement over the status quo ante either in Cuba or in Berlin. If the conflicting interests of the US and her allies are skillfully played and pressures are artfully applied, this minimum objective should not be in doubt. The US Government could not conceivably escalate any of the measures in our scenario above, in one giant leap, into an invasion of Cuba. Our line of retreat should be assured by watching for the initial moves the US might initiate in seeking to justify that invasion. If our orchestration should lead to unmistakable signs of such US measures, we should seek promptly to settle for the minimum objective of having raised doubts of the responsibility of US policy in risking war and in aiming at aggression in the Caribbean.

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